Some researchers and clinicians are inclined to see their domains of work as mutually antagonistic in some way. However, that is a mistaken idea; to the contrary, research and clinical practice are both part of the same enterprise and the qualities for success in each are closely similar. Thus, both may be viewed as voyages of discovery involving careful and systematic hypothesis-testing, with the surprise of finding out something unexpected an essential part of the rewards of success. Each new referral requires us as clinicians to develop a set of hypotheses about the nature of the problem. As we proceed with history taking, interview, observation and psychological testing, we check whether the information we are receiving tallies with the postulates with which we started and, in so doing, we reject some of our initial hypotheses and retain others. At the end of the initial clinical assessment, we may have been able to arrive at a definite formulation, or we may need the results of special investigations or response to treatment before we can come to an opinion. Treatment involves much the same process. We start with a set of ideas on what is wrong and how we may intervene to improvethe situation. However, these are hypotheses, and good clinicians will be alert to the need to use the response to treatment as a check on whether their hypotheses on mechanisms were correct or require modification. This is so whether we are concerned with hypotheses on psychodynamic mechanisms as a guide to psychotherapy, or on biological processes as a guide to drug treatment.
The parallel with research is obvious. Medawar! emphasized that good science is as much concerned with creative thinking on hypotheses, as with their testing. Both are necessary parts of the scientific enterprise, just as they are in clinical work. The main difference between the two concerns the time frame and the level of evidence possible. In clinical work we have to act now on the basis of whatever knowledge is available; we can't wait for the next piece of research to be completed. However that aside, the style of thinking should be much the same in the two domains of work. Of course, there are clinicians who do not work that way; drugs are administered in routine fashion or psychotherapy is given in the same way without thought as to whether these are appropriate in the individual case. There are clinicians who have only one therapeutic arrow in their quiver, whether it be behaviour modification or systemic family therapy, and this arrow is shot come what may in all cases. Equally, there are researchers who keep on with the same investigative strategy that they know best without pausing to consider whether it is optimal for the purpose. Also, we are all familiar with researchers who stick with a theory despite all evidence that it is wrong. But these mindless approaches in the clinical and research fields should be rejected; it is more fruitful to focus on the best in each.
Clinical practice must be empirically based
It is also the case that clinical practice must change in the light of new research findings. During our professional lifetime we are all going to have to acquire many skills and absorb much new knowledge. The notion that learning can stop when we reach the end of our period of professional training could not be further from the truth. That point was impressed on me early in my days as a medical student, at a time when I lived with my grandfather, then a man in his early 80s and still active in general practice. While I struggled with the mysteries of anatomy and physiology, he was off on the latest refresher course, making good use of the up-to-date medical texts on his bookshelf. He took his medical training in the 19th century and it would be no exaggeration to say that almost all the clinical skills that he practised had been acquired after he qualified. When he was a student scarcely any effective drugs were known, biochemistry didn't exist as an established subject and even an understanding of infectious agents was only just in its infancy! The advances in knowledge in the first half of the 20th century revolutionized medicine. But that was at a time when medical research was only just beginning -advances now are much more rapid. Witness the new horizons exploding before us as a result, for example, of molecular genetics. The lesson is clear. If we are to remain competent clinicians by the time we retire, it is crucial that we should be trained to understand research methods and be able to evaluate research reports. That is why it is essential that research constitutes an essential part of professional training -not to make clinicians into researchers but to enable clinicians to make use of research advances in the years to come. A period during training of actually undertaking a piece of research is enormously helpful in that connection.
Skills and goals of research
Both research and clinical practice require specific skills and specific training. Sometimes it is supposed that the way forward lies in getting more clinicians involved in the research process, because they are the people who best understand the clinical dilemmas. That view is mistaken. Of course, very considerable advantages derive from a combination of clinical and research skills and skilled practitioners who wish to acquire the skills of the other domain should be welcomed; but skills and training are involved. If clinicians wish to become researchers, or vice versa, they must accept the need to learn the necessary strategies, tactics and techniques. There is no short cut.
Clinical practitioners and health policy administrators often want research closely geared to current clinical practice, with a special priority on the evaluation of methods of treatment as applied today. That too, is a profoundly misguided notion. Of course, we do need to know which methods work and which do not, and some research should be directed to that end. However, in itself, if that is all that research does, there would be very little guidance on how to improve our therapeutic interventions in the future. If we are to improve the efficacy of treatment we must know the mechanisms involved -why treatment is effective in these circumstances but not in those, or for these conditions but not some other set of problems. That means that research needs to be based on reasonably explicit hypotheses on processes, and with a discriminating set of predictions on the contingencies that will determine outcome.
Thus, there has been much controversy in the past on whether individual psychotherapy 'works'; more recently, the same questions have been asked about family therapy. But suppose research established without any doubt that either of these psychological therapies was better than doing nothing (ie the control condition), how would that help? It might be reassuring to find out that what we did wasn't a total waste of time, but how would we use that information to improve our clinical practice? Psychological treatments are pretty broad in what they encompass, whether individual or family. Which elements should we develop -the support of a professional relationship, the insight of penetrating interpretations, the overt or covert manipulation of behaviour, the improvement of family communication, the balancing of relationships within the family system, or the reduction of family discord? The list is almost endless. For which conditions should we use this psychological therapy of proven utility -depression, conduct disorder, anorexia nervosa, nocturnal enuresis or autism? Is the psychological therapy indicated only when there are particular internal psychological problems, or particular family difficulties, or will it work with everyone? The claims by some therapeutic enthusiasts seem to suggest it will help everyone, but what sort of treatment is it that is totally general in its indications? It's like suggesting that penicillin is good for all medical disorders -regardless of whether it's pneumonia, cancer or coronary artery disease. Effective research on treatment needs focused hypotheses on mechanisms.
The research into the effects of negative expressed emotion (EE) on the course of schizophrenia, and into the use of family therapy to reduce it, provides an example'', It has been effective as a research endeavour just because it was theory driven. There was the postulated mechanism of high EE, which led to hypotheses on the conditions under which family therapy would be effective and those when it would not. That is, it predicted that for the relapse of schizophrenia to be reduced, the family therapy would have to reduce EE. A lack of therapeutic efficacy was to be predicted either when there wasn't high EE in the first place or when family therapy failed to reduce high EE. By contrast, therapeutic efficacy was to be expected when there was the combination of initially high EE and reduction in EE as a result of family therapy. Although the field is not free of controversy, the research findings broadly support the hypothesis", and by so doing are helpful in indicating directions for therapeutic practice. But, this is somewhat of an exception. Most therapeutic notions in child psychiatry do not have this specificity, and hence studies of treatment are not likely to be of a great deal of help. The lesson is that there needs to be a much closer coming together of clinicians and researchers in order to develop a set of hypotheses on the therapeutic mechanisms that apply to a specified and restricted set of psychiatric conditions or circumstances. Merely evaluating whether current treatments 'work' is not a good way of doing things.
Research also needs to question and challenge clinical concepts. The traffic of ideas between clinical practice and research must be two way. Applied research that simply sets out to test the prevailing clinical ideas is not likely to lead to major breakthroughs in clinical practice. It would be foolishly limiting to restrict research to investigations designed to answer the questions of clinicians and health service policy makers. The history of medicine provides a wealth of examples in which advances in treatment rested on research findings in areas that seemed to have no practical application", The distinction between so-called 'pure' and 'applied' research is unsatisfactory because the two often blend into one another and because applied research needs to have a strong theoretical element if it is to lead to advances. Nevertheless, a major part of research has to be directed to the development of pure knowledge about the natural world without too much concern as to whether it will have practical benefits. Ultimately, practical gains rely on advances in knowledge in areas that at first sight may seem somewhat distant from day-to-day clinical issues. Frequently, the researcher, rather than the clinician, is in the best position to decide which directions are going to be fruitful. Molecular biology is a striking example of a revolutionary breakthrough outside medicine that has been followed by a breath-taking rapidity of advance within medicine with obvious potential practical implications. Psychiatry also relies on physics (as for example with brain imaging) and chemistry (as with research into neurotransmitters). However, attention should not be restricted to the so-called 'hard' sciences for 'pure' research. So far as psychiatry is concerned, we need to look to psychology and to the behavioural sciences as much as to biology.
The importance of the unexpected In both clinical practice and research we need to appreciate the importance of discovering something unexpected. At the top level in clinical work, we see that in the acute clinical acumen of Kanner" who realized that within the broad group of retarded and severely disturbed children referred to him, autism represented something crucially different. Note that this discovery came from clinical practice and not from research. Or, rather similarly, the appreciation by Rett, and then by Hagberg et al. 6 that within the group of children with autistic-like disorders, there was a subgroup of girls with a slightly different set of clinical features, and a radically different course -what we now recognize as Rett's syndrome. Of course, most of us cannot aspire to the heights of discovering a new syndrome, but still progress in both diagnostic differentiation and therapeutic advances comes through the recognition of what is important in the unexpected. Exactly the same applies within research. For example, there was the observation that the culture contamination of penicillium mould inhibited bacterial growth -an unexpected chance observation that then led on to the development of antibiotics. Within psychiatry, the development of antidepressants owed much to a similar chance observation of the value of iproniazid, given as an antibacterial agent, in alleviating psychiatric problems among TB patients", or within child psychiatry there is the example of amphetamines in the treatment of hyperkinesis. Both as clinicians, and as researchers, we need to train ourselves to recognize when something unexpected occurs, and to be able to appreciate when there is an important generalizable lesson in that surprise.
The value of being proved wrongl Indeed, it could be argued that the main advances are likely to come from situations in which research or clinical experience proves us wrong, rather than right. That may seem a curiously negative suggestion but it isn't really. The point is that if research or experience simply proves us right, we haven't gained any new ideas, whereas if we are proved wrong, we are forced to re-evaluate our concepts or their application. Of course, for this to be successful, it is necessary that the disproof take place within the context of a set of theoretical notions that are supported by empirical research. In other words, we have to have something to build on, but it is helpful to be partially wrong if we are to progress.
An extension of this point concerns the value of non-replication or non-confirmation ofearlier research findings", There is a terrible tendency in behavioural sciences to adopt a football score approach; four studies positive and two negative so the hypothesis wins, or one in favour and three against, so it loses. This is obviously a nonsense. There are, of course, methodological issues that must be considered: was the research strategy appropriate, were the measures well designed, was the sample size big enough? But, assuming that the research does not fall short on these crucial considerations, we have to ask why one study differs from another in its findings. Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned -maybe the difference in results gives information on mechanisms. That is, we need to consider whether some difference between the studies tapped a difference in the essential processes involved in the phenomenon under study.
Three examples may be given from my own experiences. First, some 20 years ago I was interested in the finding that broken homes were often associated with child psychiatric disorder". That association came out strongly in our epidemiological studies in inner London but curiously in an exactly parallel study on the Isle of Wight the association was weak and statistically non-significantl. The question was why? A closer look at the findings gave a possible answer; namely that the causes and consequences of broken homes were quite different in the two areas. In London it was usually an indicator of family discord, whereas on the Isle of Wight this was less often the case. The non-replication suggested that, perhaps, discord rather than the break up of a home, was the key risk factor. Subsequent research has generally confirmed that inference!", A second example concerns the occasional reports that some supposedly autistic children develop schizophrenia in early adult life ll . Those reports have always puzzled me, because that has just not been my experience, in spite of seeing several hundred autistic individuals over the years. The difference between studies had to have some meaning but it wasn't clear what that was. Recently, my colleague Lynn Mawhood has followed up the group of normally intelligent, developmental receptive 'aphasic' and autistic boys that we first studied some 20 years ag0 12. Interestingly, three of the some two dozen boys with developmental language disorders developed florid paranoid psychoses in late adolescence or early adult life -an outcome that was not seen in any of the autistic children. Of course, three cases is not very many but the contrast with the findings for autism suggest that perhaps language disordered children had syndromes in childhood that others would have labelled autistic. That is certainly a possibility as most of the children with severe developmental disorders of receptive language had quite marked social problems. It remains to be seen whether or not that is so but clearly it is a possibility worth exploring. Incidentally, it does emphasize the continuing need for careful diagnostic distinctions.
The third example also concerns autism. Scandinavian researchers have reported that up to 20% of autistic children show the fragile X anomaly; whereas others, including ourselves, have found rates below 5%13. Why? Two main possibilities presented themselves. First, it may be that the laboratory findings were being interpreted differently in the different centres and, secondly, that different clinical pictures were being labelled autistic. While the story does not yet have a conclusive ending, it now seems that both explanations are probably correct. It appears that the clinical syndromes associated with the fragile X that some clinicians have loosely labelled autistic, are actually somewhat different in form from autism as conceptualized by most of US 13 .
The tyranny of the given wisdom Within both clinical work and research, there is a terrible tendency to want to constrain what is done within the currently prevailing set of assumptions. Eisenberg!' has eloquently described the twin dangers of 'brainlessness' and 'mindlessness' in psychiatry. He urged the need to accept both that the brain is the organ of the mind and that Homo sapiens is a social, thinking animal; a consideration that carries the expectation that behaviour will be influenced by both thought processes and interpersonal interactions. In research we have the tyrannies of theory, of methods, and of measures, and all must be resisted. Of course, each has an essential place; investigations need to be hypothesis guided and good investigations are based on well-conceived and welltested methods and measures. But the questions to be tackled need to determine the strategies and tactics, not the other way round. Both research and clinical practice need to challenge the given truths of the moment.
These points may be illustrated by a brief look at the history of two child psychiatric conditions, autism'" and depresaion'P. During the 1950s, autism was considered to be a psychogenic disorder by many psychiatrists. A long-term follow-up then showed that a high proportion developed epileptic fits in late adolescence and attention shifted to possible organic factors. However, genetic factors were given little attention because the very low rate (circa 2%) of autism in sibs seemed to suggest that they were unlikely to playa major role. A realization that this was false logic (because, although 2% is low in absolute terms it is some 50 times the base rate in the general population) led on to a twin study that showed that genetic factors were important, a finding subsequently confirmed by other research'P, Up to the 1970s, most child psychiatrists were very sceptical about the existence of depressive conditions in childhood other than rarely. Thus, in the Isle of Wight epidemiological studies, all emotional disorders were initially grouped together. However, the data from the follow-up in adolescence showed that depressive disorders, unlike anxiety disorders, became much more frequent in that age period. Subsequent research has confirmed that finding" and follow-up studies into adult life have shown a strong and specific continuity with major affective disorders in adult life 16 • It remains the case that depressive disorders are much less common in childhood than in adult life but the reality of childhood depression can be doubted no longer.
Several lessons may be seen in these examples. First, both exemplify the importance of unexpected findings. We were not looking for epileptic fits when we first followed up the group of autistic children, but the finding was nevertheless important in its clinical implications. Note, however, that this is also an example of where a clinical approach to follow-up, together with clinical knowledge, both made it likely that the unexpected would be noticed and that its significance would be appreciated. Similarly, in the Isle of Wight study, we weren't looking for age trends in depression and indeed our measures were not really optimal for that purpose, but the finding was nonetheless important in raising important clinical and research questions. Indirectly, it led on to a change in clinical concept.
Secondly, mistakes are inevitable in both clinical practice and research. The important thing is to learn from our mistakes -to recognize when we have been wrong, to try to understand why we were wrong, and to be willing to change our concepts and our practice when our errors indicate that we should do so. It is a foolish person indeed who always wants to be proved right; that could only indicate that they had learned nothing and had failed to progress in their work.
Thirdly, a two-way traffic between clinical practice and research is needed. Clinical questions provide the stimulus for much research but, equally, research findings that had not heen anticipated clinically have helped to reshape clinical concepts. Moreover, our ability to investigate clinical questions further is heavily dependent on research that has had entirely different roots.
Fourthly, some of the key advances stem in the first instance from astute clinical observations -such as the separation of new syndromes by the likes of Kanner, Rett and Hagberg. The need for careful systematic clinical study is very much still with us and there are grave dangers in the excessive use of structured questionnaires and the like, which supposedly objectify data gathering, but do so at the cost of avoidance of all clinical skills. That does Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 83 July 1990 447 not seem to me sensible, and the trend is a worrying one.
Finally, there is the risk of seeing worthwhile research only in terms of high technology megainvestigations. Of course, high powered research is an essential part of the research enterprise. Nevertheless, many advances are based on quite modest projects by clinician-researchers. Leo Kanner used to enjoy teasing those of us who are professional researchers by the boast that he had never ever held a research grant! Well, he was a quite remarkable man, whom we can only strive inadequately to emulate, and in any case, his tongue was in his cheek. Nevertheless, his basic message is as applicable today as it was then -namely, that all of us in our clinical practice should seek to improve our knowledge and understanding, and in so doing to help others do so as well. That constitutes the individual aspect of the interface between clinical practice and research, an aspect to which the same principles apply as those outlined with respect to the field as a whole.
